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The “Gayification” of Tel Aviv:
Examining Israel’s Pro-Gay Brand
Satch ie  Snel l ing s
New Yor k  Un i v er s i t y,  Glob a l  L i be r a l  S t udi e s
To someone informed on the modern world’s LGBT hot spots, the mention of Israeli homosexuality would most often connote images 
of a crowded pride parade or a rainbow themed beach party packed 
with same-sex couples and carefree attitudes. This picture, whether in a 
film, on a poster, or in reality, is one of Tel Aviv, the self-proclaimed “Gay 
Capital of the Middle East.”1 It is the most popular and well-known 
image of the Israeli LGBT community.
The history of LGBT rights in Israel predates that of many Western 
nations, including the United States. Israeli gay rights ensure that all 
LGBT citizens receive many of the same rights to their heterosexual 
counterparts, albeit with less publicized shortfalls in terms of health, edu-
cation and welfare laws. The greatest exception and the most significant 
encroachment of faith onto the legality of homosexuality is in the lack 
of legal gay marriage in Israel. Alongside their crafting of legal rights, 
the Israeli government has invested heavily in the coastal city of Tel 
Aviv, rebranding it as a globally recognized “gay destination.” This effort 
resulted in a fiscally beneficial gay tourism industry and a more positive 
international reputation for Israel. Tel Aviv now attracts LGBT individu-
als and allies from within Israel and across the globe.
Tel Aviv’s well-known reputation as a pro-gay, modern destina-
tion can sometimes distract from inquiries into the status of the LGBT 
community in the rest of Israel. The city has been referred to in film, 
print, and by its residents as HaBuah (“The Bubble”).2 This idea of Tel 
© 2019 Satchie Snellings. All Rights Reserved.
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Aviv as a “bubble” suggests a distinction between its own identity and 
that of the rest of Israel. This gap is particularly visible when addressing 
homosexuality. The LGBT population faces strong opposition in certain 
Israeli communities outside of Tel Aviv. The tension between homosexu-
ality and portions of the Israeli citizenry represents the ongoing struggle 
between secular and religious identity in Israel. This identity confusion 
is particularly evident when comparing tolerance towards the LGBT 
community in Tel Aviv to that in the capital city of Jerusalem, home to 
a largely religious population. The status of homosexuality in Jerusalem 
and in the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community suggests that Tel Aviv 
may truly be a “bubble” of homosexual acceptance.
This paper addresses the status of homosexuality in Israel and the 
question of national identity. It investigates how gay city branding has 
been used to establish Israel as a more progressive, western nation and Tel 
Aviv as one of the world’s best gay cities. Further it asks: Is Israel as toler-
ant of homosexuality as its reputation suggest? How is homosexuality 
regarded in Israel’s growing ultra-Orthodox community and how does it 
align with the Israeli pro-gay brand? To what extent is homosexuality a 
part of Israel’s national identity? These points are central to the longterm 
survival of LGBT rights in Israel.
History of LGBT rights in Israel
The growing industry of gay tourism to Israel and transformation of Tel 
Aviv into a globally recognized LGBT destination relied upon the initial 
provision of legal rights to Israel’s LGBT citizens. The history of LGBT 
rights in Israel technically began in 1963 when the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Buggery Act of 1533,3 a remnant of the British Mandate for 
Palestine,4 should not be used to persecute consenting adults who engage 
in private same-sex sexual activity. Homosexual sexual activity was offi-
cially legalized in 1988 by Israel’s legislative assembly, the Knesset. In 
1992 Israel passed legislation that outlawed employment discrimination 
on the grounds of homosexuality. Often cited as proof of Israel’s com-
mitment to equality is the 1993 decision to allow openly gay men and 
women to serve in the military. This policy came eighteen years prior to 
the United States’ repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”5 which served the 
same purpose.
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In 1994 Israel began granting unregistered cohabitation6 for 
homosexual couples, providing them with the same spousal benefits as 
heterosexual couples in a common-law marriage. Legislation passed in 
1999 and 2000 provided insurance benefits and pension rights respec-
tively to same-sex couples. Stepchild adoption was legalized for Israeli 
same-sex couples in 2005, and in 2008 it was ruled that gay couples 
could jointly adopt a child that was not biologically related to either of 
them. A significant moment for gay rights in Israel came in 2006 when 
the High Court of Justice declared that same-sex marriages performed 
abroad must be registered in Israel. The ruling however mandated that 
the marriages be recorded for “the purpose of collecting statistics,”7 as 
opposed to simply for the purpose of equal rights. A major milestone 
came for the Israeli transgender community in 2013. The Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) allowed a transgender woman to serve as a female soldier.8 
This decision reflects the growing support for transgender individuals in 
liberal Israeli society. Further on June 2, 2015 the Israeli National Labor 
Court ruled in a case that the Equality of Opportunities in Labour Law, 
which outlaws discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation 
also extends to discrimination on the basis of gender identity.9 This ruling 
set an important precedent for the transgender community and rights in 
the workplace, but there is still much work to be done to establish equal 
legal protections for transgender people in Israel.
In 2014, following years of individual court cases, the Interior Min-
ister Gidon Sa’ar stated that the Law of Return10 provides citizenship to 
same sex couples married abroad, even if one of the married persons is 
not Jewish.11 These laws protecting the LGBT community have been 
far better received in Tel Aviv than in Israel’s more conservative areas. 
Despite being one of the most legally accepting nations of LGBT indi-
viduals in the world, there is one area in which Israel falls far behind 
many western countries: marriage.
Marriage in Israel is controlled by a confessional community 
system in which marriage, as a religious institution, is under the author-
ity of whichever recognized community a person belongs. For the Jewish 
majority, this authority is the Chief Rabbinate of Israel. There are other 
such authorities for various Christian, Muslim and Druze minorities as 
well. These religious courts are each responsible for regulating marriage 
and divorce among the Israeli citizens who are categorized as belonging 
to their religion, whether actively religious or not. As of August 2019 
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none of the recognized religious courts in Israel perform same-sex mar-
riages. If any of these religious authorities were to change their stance, 
LGBT citizens belonging to that particular religion could legally marry 
in Israel without any government intervention or legislation.
The absence of gay marriage in Israel is not a direct result of the 
government’s stance on the issue but more of its insistence on keeping 
the status quo regarding the complicated balance between the state and 
religion. The Israeli government and judicial bodies have supplemented 
the lack of legal gay marriage by providing homosexual couples with 
nearly all the rights of marriage granted to their heterosexual counter-
parts in the state. The religious, as opposed to governmental, hold on 
marriage has contributed to the minimal amount of gay marriage advo-
cacy in Israel. This movement does exist but is smaller than many of its 
European or American counterparts. This is partly due to the knowledge 
that lobbying a religious authority on behalf of gay marriage is a larger 
challenge than lobbying a government, and party due to homosexual 
Israeli couples already enjoying most of the same rights as heterosexual 
married couples.
The question of gay marriage was raised by the author in a 2016 
personal interview with Ilay,12 a representative of the Jerusalem Open 
House for Pride and Tolerance, Jerusalem’s leading LGBT organization. 
His response clarified that, despite legal equality, there are still more 
pressing issues for the Israeli LGBT community to address before turn-
ing to marriage. Ilay brought up the verbal and physical abuse of LGBT 
Israeli teens as an issue which should be confronted before delving into 
matters of marriage and religion. He mentioned that the use of gay slurs 
in schools is pervasive and damaging to vulnerable LGBT teens, saying, 
“Being called gay is like the most frequent swear word you’ll hear in 
schools. ‘Homo’ you’ll hear it all over, with other offensive, more descrip-
tive swears.”13 While reiterating that marriage is not the current priority, 
Ilay brought up the ongoing struggle between secularism and religion in 
Israel, saying, “It connects with the secular struggle, right now marriages 
in Israel are done religiously. There is always a rabbi in every wedding 
and that is the only way it can be done. I know a lot of people don’t 
agree with it. There is a struggle for gay marriage obviously, but I think 
it’s not the main thing that our community is trying to achieve.”14
Still in August 2017 the LGBT Association in Israel brought a peti-
tion to the High Court of Justice to recognize same-sex marriages in 
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Israel. The High Court rejected the petition citing that they could not 
rule on a matter that fell under the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts. 
The Court also passed the buck for any further rulings on this matter to 
the legislature stating, “On the matter of recognizing marriage that was 
not conducted in accordance to the religious law—including same-sex 
marriage—it was ruled [by the court] in the past that it is better that the 
issue be determined by the legislative branch.”15 Such a legislative policy 
is unlikely to be enacted. The government will not push to change the 
system of marriage for fear of upsetting the balance with the religious 
community, particularly in light of growing ultra-Orthodox influence in 
the Knesset.
Despite already established LGBT rights and widespread govern-
mental support for gay tourism religious and conservative factions in 
the Knesset, particularly the Haredi parties, have blocked a number of 
legal milestones for the LGBT community. In February 2017 three bills 
regarding the LGBT community were voted down in the Knesset. The 
three laws proposed banning gender or sexual orientation-based cat-
calls at sporting events, mandating training for educational professionals 
on matters of gender and sexual preference and banning gender and 
sexual orientation-based discrimination against students.16 Sponsor of the 
second bill MK Michal Rozin blamed the Haredi parties and their influ-
ence in the Knesset for the failure of the bills. Rozin, a member of the 
Caucus for the LGBT Community, stated “The fear of the Haredi parties 
and narrow coalition considerations leave the members of the [LGBT] 
community discriminated against in the law books.”17
Similar complaints about the Haredi parties have been made by 
other pro-LGBT Knesset members. In June 2017 MK Merav Ben-Ari 
lamented that, “We have a really big issue with legislation, because you 
can’t do anything with the ultra-Orthodox in the government . . . In my 
opinion, the state is supposed to be better for LGBT families.”18 While 
the country benefits from it’s pro-gay brand and tourism to Tel Aviv, 
growing homophobic factions in the Knesset wage less publicized legal 
battles against the LGBT community. Ongoing LGBT issues requiring 
legislative support include surrogacy policy, sperm bank procedure, trans-
gender marriage rights and military forms that require soldiers to name 
both a mother and a father specifically, among others.19
In July 2018 the tension between the current right-wing religious 
government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the LGBT 
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community and its allies rose to the public sphere when a new surro-
gacy bill was brought before the Knesset.20 Previously surrogacy in Israel 
was only legal for married heterosexual couples struggling to conceive, 
while single and LGBT men and women were only permitted to use 
surrogates outside of the country. The new bill extended the right to 
surrogacy to single women but not men, effectively barring gay men 
from using surrogates. An amendment to include gay men was proposed 
by MK Amir Ohana of the ruling Likud party, who spoke openly about 
his own experience as a gay parent prohibited from using a surrogate 
in Israel. Ohana and his partner’s own surrogate gave birth in a foreign 
country before full term and the couple was unable to be present at the 
hospital with their newborn twins.21 Contracting surrogates outside of 
the country is not only emotionally taxing but it often costs upwards of 
$100,000. Such high costs make parenthood inaccessible to gay couples 
who do not meet a high bar of personal wealth. Ohana appealed to 
religious lawmakers to approve the amendment, stating, “I am not incit-
ing against the rabbinate or against the religious—I’m just asking for a 
little humanity.”22
In response to the public outcry Netanyahu initially endorsed 
 Ohana’s amendment and the LGBT community, but he went on to 
reverse his position and vote against the amendment, which failed, two 
days later. Netanyahu was criticized for bowing to the ultra-Orthodox 
contingent of his coalition and betraying his LGBT citizens. Itzik Shmuli, 
a gay lawmaker in the Zionist Union party, voiced his outrage at the 
prime minister’s actions stating, “Netanyahu has sold the most impor-
tant thing in our society to an extremist minority in his government 
for extraneous political interests: the value of equality.”23 The passage of 
the bill sparked citywide protests in Tel Aviv on July 22nd with 100,000 
people marching against the homophobic law.24 Roughly 200 companies 
granted their employees paid leave to attend the protest in a strong show 
of commercial support for the LGBT community.25 These events high-
light not only the remaining hurdles facing the Israeli LGBT community 
but also the massive disparity between the progressive, pro-gay Israeli 
community, particularly in Tel Aviv, and the increasingly right-wing and 
religious government.
The absence of total legal equality and acceptance for the LGBT 
community throughout Israel can be credited to the challenge of sup-
porting liberal values in a largely conservative and religious society. 
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Gay-friendly policies have further secularized Israel, suggesting some 
government interest in taking the country in a direction that does not 
align with the vision for Israel held by some religious minorities, such 
as the ultra-Orthodox community. However, such policies continue 
to fall short of true equality as religious and right-wing power grows. 
Still, Israel’s LGBT rights remain quite advanced on a global scale and 
its investment in the LGBT community has benefited not only its gay 
citizens but the state, both fiscally and in terms of its reputation. These 
benefits are clearly visible in the city of Tel Aviv.
Tel Aviv, the “gay capital of the Middle East”
Tel Aviv held its first gay pride parade in 1998. In 2019 more than 
250,000 people attended the city’s nineteenth annual pride with an esti-
mated 25,000–30,000 having come from abroad.26 The 2019 theme was 
“The Struggle Continues,” highlighting the ongoing fight for LGBT 
equality in Israel. Past themes include “The Community Makes History” 
(2018), “Bisexuality Visibility” (2017), “Women for a Change” (2016), 
and “Transgender Visibility” (2015). Gay Pride is one of Tel Aviv’s most 
anticipated annual events. It is estimated that gay tourism is responsible 
for at minimum one-tenth of Israel’s June tourism profits. Branding 
experts, the Israeli government, and the tourism industry suggest that Tel 
Aviv’s status as a “gay city”27 has led to an increase in non-LGBT tourism 
as well. This is a result of the tolerant, fun, and modern perception of Tel 
Aviv that accompanies its gay-friendly international reputation.
Tel Aviv today benefits from the city-wide gay identity estab-
lished over the last decade. TLVFest, “Tel Aviv’s International LGBT 
Film Festival,” began in 2006.28 Since launching in a Tel Aviv record 
store the self-described “only LGBT film festival in the Middle East,”29 
has grown into an internationally ranked LGBT film festival. In 2008 
the city cemented their commitment to LGBT Jewish and non-Jewish 
persons, past, present and future, through the creation of a monument 
honoring homosexuals persecuted by the Nazis in World War II. The 
memorial takes the shape of a pink triangle, the symbol gays and lesbians 
were made to wear in Holocaust concentration camps.30 The monument 
is located in Tel Aviv’s Meir Park alongside the city’s Gay Center.31 Since 
the Center’s establishment in 2008, the park has been home to LGBT 
individuals and allies on their way to and from various social gatherings, 
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counseling meetings, or support groups. Some people simply come to sit 
and socialize in the building’s park-side coffee shop. Tel Aviv’s gay iden-
tity that is obvious in Meir Park was confirmed on a much larger scale 
in 2011, when Tel Aviv was voted the world’s “Best Gay City” in a global 
survey conducted by Gaycities.com and American Airlines.32
Apart from the obvious sense of pride felt by Tel Aviv’s LGBT and 
gay-friendly population, the worldwide perception of Tel Aviv as a gay 
destination represents a significant victory for the country’s image and 
industry. Dana Bensimon discusses how Israel has benefited from the 
Tel Aviv gay scene in her thesis “Tel Aviv—A Gay City? Conceptualizing 
the phenomenon of gay cities in city branding.”33 Bensimon includes a quote 
from Shai Doitsh in which he references the successful “rebranding” 
of Tel Aviv as a gay city. Doitsh served as the head of tourism for the 
Aguda, Israel’s most prominent LGBT organization, from 2004 to 2012 
and is now the Aguda’s executive chairman. Explaining the city’s transi-
tion from a reputation of conflict to one of tolerance, Doitsh states, “Tel 
Aviv’s image was [previously known for] ‘bombing,’ ‘military’ and ‘people 
in uniform’ . . . When people realize that Tel Aviv is so open-minded, 
it can’t be that scary, and automatically it is becoming free, safe, very 
tolerant, very open-minded and it brought us a lot of other types of 
tourists.”34 This quote establishes that being perceived as “tolerant” greatly 
improves both international public opinion of Tel Aviv and the Israeli 
economy. Central to the establishment of Tel Aviv as “gay capital of the 
Middle East,”35 or as Israel’s Gay Vibe campaign suggests, “of the world,” 
are the concepts of city branding and gay tourism.
City branding
The concept of place branding, of which city branding is one type, grew 
out of the traditional marketing strategy of applying brands to objects. 
In Cultures and Globalization: Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance,36 
Helmut K. Anheier expands on this evolution: “Marketing practitioners 
commonly employed branding as a way to increase the value of their 
products and it was thought that this technique could also be used to 
brand places, such as cities, regions and nations.”37 Though the recorded 
history of marketing extends over a century, place branding did not 
develop as a professional marketing tactic until the 1990s.38 The recent 
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discovery of this strategy has led to its global popularity, causing cities to 
compete for various identities within the international tourism realm.
The principal aim of city branding is to establish the city as a pop-
ular travel destination and provide a steady, if sometimes niche, stream of 
tourism. Anheier discusses an alternate purpose: “It has also been used 
as a tool for regeneration and countering negative images in cities.”39 
Each of these goals are relevant to Israel’s decision to rebrand Tel Aviv, 
both in the interest of improving Israeli tourism and of replacing the 
international view of Israel as a nation associated with conflict and ten-
sion. In How to Brand Nations, Cities and Destinations,40 by T. Moilanen 
and S. Rainisto, the ‘X factor’ of city branding is discussed. Exploring 
the process of city branding, they explain that, “A place can be branded 
when the right tool, the identity, has been chosen[,] which makes it 
stand out from its competitors.”41 In the case of Israel, the decision to 
rebrand came prior to the selection of the city’s eventual gay identity.
In 2005 the Jerusalem Daily Forward printed the article “Israel 
Aims to Improve Its Public Image.”42 It discussed the search for a new 
approach to improving Israel’s international reputation. The particular 
significance of this article was its mention of the Brand Israel Group. 
This volunteer coalition consisted of seven marketing experts and was 
headed by Ido Aharoni, a former media and public affairs consultant 
in the Israeli consulate in New York.43 The article plainly explained the 
logic behind the creation of the “Brand Israel” campaign, which came at 
the behest of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, and the Office 
of the Prime Minister.44 The campaign reacted to in-depth research that 
claimed non-Israelis struggled to relate to or even understand the people 
of Israel. Gidon Meir, then deputy director-general for public affairs at 
the Foreign Ministry, explained the group’s intention was to formulate 
a rebranding effort aimed at the United States and Europe.45 The 2005 
article only established the government’s decision to shift international 
perception, especially in the West. It did not reveal any specific tactics.
In 2010 the subject was revisited at the tenth annual Herziliya 
Conference46 aimed at confronting the continuing issue of Israel’s nega-
tive image. The conference brought together a variety of marketing and 
branding experts to debate the best approach for Israel. Brand Israel 
Group leader Aharoni gave a speech in which he summarized Israel’s 
perception problem: “Universally, Israel’s DNA is about the conflict and 
the context within which Israel is being perceived is all about bad news. 
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Whether you agree with Israeli policies or not it’s irrelevant. Even our 
biggest supporters are unable to relate to us.”47 His research revealed 
that Israelis saw themselves as “modern, creative, friendly.” Intent on 
communicating this identity to the global screen, Aharoni presented 
his rebranding approach. Aharoni lectured, “You have to restore—and I 
use the word restore rather than create—restore Israel’s relevance in the 
world, by communicating Israel’s success, by identifying Israel’s relative 
advantages. And then begin a long-term strategic celebration of those 
relative advantages.”48 Aharoni offered his expertise on city branding, 
explaining that there are, in his opinion, two words that matter: “person-
ality and attraction.”49
The Herziliya Conference produced a working paper titled “Win-
ning the Battle of the Narrative.”50 It summarized the branding debate 
and conclusions for future strategies. The Israeli government’s official 
branding effort, Creative Energy, sought to project a brand that com-
municated characteristics like, “building the future, vibrant diversity and 
entrepreneurial zeal.”51 It was also widely agreed that all future brand-
ing efforts must engage those belonging to the Western European and 
American elite. The report offers the expert’s reasoning, “To create 
and mobilize support, one must point to convergent morals and simi-
lar values. In that sense, messages should be coupled with examples of 
similar compatible values of Israel with the West. Gaining the trust of 
members of Western elites and thus strengthening their association with 
Israel can influence Israel’s image very favourably.”52 This same strategy of 
engaging liberal elites was encouraged in the Tel Aviv-based Reut Insti-
tute’s53 2010 study, “The Assault on Israel’s Legitimacy.”54 The conclusion 
being that in 2010 Israel was committed to recasting its international 
identity in a manner that steered away from conflict, highlighted moder-
nity, diversity, and future, and especially appealed to Western liberal elites 
who could impact public opinion and create stronger ties between Israel, 
America and Europe. The first signs of gay branding in Tel Aviv came 
that same year.
Bensimon’s interviews with representatives of the Israeli govern-
ment, tourism industry, and LGBT community explore the decision 
to rebrand using a gay identity, its impact on the Israeli LGBT popu-
lation, and its effect on international perception. In keeping with the 
goal of appealing to Western values and modernity, branding efforts 
were directed at establishing a pro-gay identity in the city of Tel Aviv. 
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Bensimon analyzes this choice, theorizing that, “Gays are likely to be 
a preferred minority, considerably wealthy and found to attract other 
desired segments helping the city to keep up with its competition.”55 
This strategy is effective but attention should be drawn to the fact that 
it relies upon a portrayal of homosexuality that aligns with the West-
ern perception alone. In Pink Tourism56 Howard L. Hughes provides a 
common image of this archetype: “the gay consumer, at least in the USA, 
has been that of male, white, professional, affluent, good-looking and 
youthful, trend-setting and well-educated.”57 This ‘consumer’ is pervasive 
throughout American LGBT imagery, despite the fact that the major-
ity of LGBT people in the United States are not in fact well-educated 
male professionals.58 In Israeli gay branding the tourism strategy stays 
true to this image. This is partially due to the gay male industry being 
more accessible than the lesbian demographic. It is also an appeal to the 
European and American pro-gay communities, who share this depiction 
of the respectable, carefree, employed consumer. This particular version of 
gay identity is not targeted at the international LGBT community, rather 
it is targeted at the Western world, their values and their opinions.
The effectiveness of this choice, pursuing a gay brand, is confirmed 
by Doitsh. Casually recounting the decision, he shares, “In the begin-
ning when people asked us: ‘Why did you choose the gay segment?’ our 
council member who is in charge of the tourism for the city said: ‘First 
the gays will come, and then the rest.’ And it showed it was a success 
because actually now we have a lot of segments coming to Tel Aviv.”59 
Doitsh simultaneously argues that the Israeli gay community benefits 
from this brand, the suggestion is that the gay community’s contribution 
to the economy enhances their place in society and the state’s apprecia-
tion of their demographic.
The senior deputy director general at the Israeli Ministry of 
Tourism, Pini Shani, claims the gay branding of Tel Aviv also changed 
the identity of the city from a “religious destination to an ethnic 
destination.”60 This established Tel Aviv as a place geared towards secular 
modernity over religious history—a popular brand in Israel. The inherent 
suggestion of this branding is that infusing the gay identity into Tel Aviv’s 
international brand caused a further separation between Tel Aviv and 
the rest of Israel, namely, other urban tourist destinations, such as Jerusa-
lem. Eytan Schwartz, chief executive officer of the Municipality-owned 
branding initiative Tel Aviv Global, gives his take on the individuality 
38
S n e l l i n g s  Q u e e r  C a t s     v o l .  3 - 4  2 0 1 9
of the Tel Aviv brand: “The dissociation of Tel Aviv from its country in 
the branding could be explained by the fear of resistance, but it mainly 
aims at improving the image and touristic situation of Israel abroad via 
Tel Aviv.”61 Schwartz touches on a central point in this statement. In 
order to establish itself as pro-gay, progressive and modern Tel Aviv must 
separate itself from the rest of Israel and yet all of Israel benefits from 
the increase in tourism and Israel’s shifting global reputation. Consistent 
gay tourism to Tel Aviv permits Israel to maintain this liberal, modern, 
tolerant identity.
Gay tourism
In 2010 Israel launched the “Tel Aviv Gay Vibe” campaign in Western 
Europe. A Wider Bridge, a pro-Israel organization based in San Francisco 
and pivotal to the branding campaign, describes Tel Aviv Gay Vibe as “a 
collaboration between Israel’s Ministry of Tourism, the Tel Aviv Tourism 
Board and Israel’s preeminent LGBT institution, the Aguda, to fulfill the 
city’s promise as the world’s newest gay capital.”62 An expert on gay tour-
ism, Hughes explores patterns of the gay tourist demographic and how 
to market cities towards the LGBT segment in Pink Tourism.63 Similar to 
Ido Aharoni, Hughes preaches the need to attract.
In Hughes’ model, tourist attractions form the nucleus of the 
gay tourism system. Hughes explains the nucleus process as, “Nucleus 
becomes a tourist attraction or destination by the influence of markers 
such as guidebooks, films, books, television programmes and recommen-
dations, and also promotional material generating images of the nucleus 
. . . If they relate positively to motivations, these images may generate 
tourist flow. Tourist places are thus marked or coded as such and the 
choice of places to visit is influenced by ‘place-myth’—the creation of 
image.”64 This process is exemplified in the Gay Vibe campaign, which 
uses social media, foreign magazines, mobile phone applications, and 
international LGBT events to promote Tel Aviv as a tourist attraction, 
or nucleus, for gay tourists.65 Gay Vibe provides tourists with a com-
prehensive online guide to gay Tel Aviv, consisting of detailed maps and 
weekly events and promotions. These physical advertisements and mate-
rials encourage a connection between the gay tourist and the city of Tel 
Aviv. The success of this process creates a cycle in which tourists come to 
Israel because of its tolerant, pro-gay ‘image.’
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Doitsh describes Gay Vibe’s image of the city: “The campaign sells 
Tel Aviv as a free, fun, and fabulous city. ‘A metropolis along the beach, 
a free and safe place in which you can enjoy yourself.’”66 Director of 
marketing for Tel Aviv Gay Vibe (2009 - 2012) and prominent gay-rights 
advocate/lesbian party promoter Anat Nir offers insight into the suc-
cess of their branding campaign. Reacting to the 2011 “Best Gay City” 
award, Nir exclaimed, “[Y]ears of hard work, international travels and 
promotion [,] we finally did it. Tel Aviv is on the map. This news has got 
into every major communications channel here and we are very proud. 
Of course this means that this year is going to be full of LGBT incoming 
tourism which is our aim. Small city huge impact.”67
Israel has consistently invested in gay tourism since 2011 and the 
city and its reputation continue to thrive. However, Israel’s own LGBT 
community is not as thrilled as the government and tourism industry. In 
2016 the Israeli Ministry of Tourism announced a plan to invest 11 mil-
lion Shekels to promote gay tourism to Israel overseas. This plan quickly 
came under fire by Israel’s own LGBT community because the govern-
ment had only allocated 1.5 million Shekels in funding to actual Israeli 
LGBT groups for the year.68 The Aguda released the following statement 
condemning the government and the disparity in funding:
“Gay tourism is nice and the income it generates to the state is blessed. It’s 
just that the LGBT citizens of Israel, who live all over Israel, all year long, 
not just on Tel Aviv Gay Pride Weekend, there is no physical security, no 
employment, no equal rights and the budgets for education, information 
and services to the community are pathetic and insulting. As we have said 
again and again at the Knesset on LGBT Rights Day, the huge investment 
in publicity abroad is absurd while the LGBT advocacy inside Israel gets 
zero funding and the State of Israel does nothing against the raging LGBT-
phobia that claimed the life of Shira Banli Z”L69 only last summer.”70
In response to the criticism the government agreed to invest 10 mil-
lion Shekels annually for two years in the LGBT community.71 This 
controversy is representative of a perception that Israel’s investment in 
its pro-gay brand is of a greater priority to the government than the 
ongoing well-being of its own LGBT community. The Labor Party’s 
LGBT Caucus similarly noted in an official statement that six separate 
bills proposed to benefit the LGBT community were rejected just a 
month prior to this investment plan.72 The caucus echoed the Aguda’s 
sentiments criticizing the government for prioritizing gay tourism over 
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the issues facing its LGBT citizens, including violence in schools and 
discrimination against LGBT individuals.
A 2018 report by the Nir Katz center for LGBT Violence reported 
a 26% increase in discrimination complaints by LGBTQ Israelis in the 
previous year, 17% of these complaints were of violent incidents and 
a majority came from transgender and gender queer individuals.73 In 
response to the report Aguda chair Chen Arieli reflected on the societal 
discrimination facing LGBT Israelis,
“[M]any of the reports are just the tip of the iceberg, because behind 
them hide more cases that are not reported at all—be it from fear, shame 
or loss of trust in law enforcement . . . the unbearable ease with which 
LGBTphobia is translated into threats and violence, along with concrete 
discrimination, which requires all legal authorities to mobilize and fight 
with all their might. LGBTphobia is growing on a fertile ground of serious 
statements made by public figures, rabbis and MKs—and there’s no one to 
condemn or censure their words.”74
Arieli’s statement highlights the need for government, law enforcement 
and religious authorities to protect the LGBT community and confront 
areas in which homophobia has been normalized in Israel. However he 
states that some members of these bodies are not succeeding in this effort 
and are even helping foster homophobic environments. Such actions are 
a direct contradiction of Israel’s pro-gay identity and external brand and 
most importantly a serious harm to the LGBT community. Discrimina-
tion and societal homophobia are especially relevant to LGBT Israelis 
living outside of the liberal center of Tel Aviv.
Tel Aviv the bubble? Homosexuality outside of Tel Aviv
It is important to understand the distinctions between Tel Aviv and the 
rest of Israel when discussing Israeli homosexuality. The tendency in the 
Israeli government, pro-Israel organizations, and the international media 
to focus solely on Tel Aviv when discussing the subject of homosexual-
ity and liberal values often distracts from the status of these subjects 
throughout the remainder of the country. As the purpose of this paper 
is to investigate Israeli homosexuality and city branding it will not delve 
into the widely different and challenging circumstances facing LGBT 
Palestinians. Instead it looks to explore the disparity of experience within 
Israel’s own LGBT community outside of Tel Aviv through the lens of 
Jerusalem and the ultra-Orthodox community. A central issue in this 
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analysis, highlighted in the replacement of a religious brand in Tel Aviv, is 
secular versus religious identity.
The branding decision to encourage a separation between reli-
gion and homosexuality in Tel Aviv suggests that the two cannot coexist. 
While this is technically incorrect, recent poling indicates that in Israel 
the link between religion and homophobia remains present. Addition-
ally, while the branding efforts improved gay tourism to Tel Aviv and 
assuredly benefited the international perception of tolerance in Israel, 
homophobia is far more widespread than Israel’s new reputation suggests. 
A 2013 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center asked, “Should 
Society Accept Homosexuality?” 47% percent of Israeli responses said 
“No,” while only 40% said “Yes.”75 These statistics were particularly 
alarming since they came two years after Tel Aviv was voted the “Best 
of Gay Cities” worldwide. Also in 2013, the Israeli Democracy Index 
conducted a study in which they asked Israelis “It would bother me to 
have as neighbors. . . .” The answer “A homosexual couple” was chosen 
46.2% (Arab sample),76 68.4% (Jewish Haredi sample), 48.4% (Jewish 
National Religious/Haredi-leumi sample), 37.5% (Jewish Traditional 
religious sample), 28.2% (Jewish Traditional non-religious sample), and 
17.6% (Jewish Secular sample).77
Homosexuality in Jerusalem
Only an hour away, the Jerusalem brand varies significantly from that 
of Tel Aviv. Considered a holy city by Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, 
the country’s capital is home to a large religious population. It is also 
home to an LGBT community. This community is proud and strong 
but often faces challenges. The Jerusalem Open House for Pride and 
Tolerance78 provides a safe and supportive base for the Jerusalem LGBT 
community. The city is home to one gay bar and, like all Israelis, the 
residents are privy to extensive LGBT rights. The challenge in Jerusalem 
is the presence of homophobia in the city, especially in regards to the 
ultra-Orthodox community, and the suggestion that, in Jerusalem, homo-
sexuality should remain a bit more covert. Tom Canning, a spokesman 
for Jerusalem Open House, explains, “There’s a general sentiment, very 
mainstream in Israeli society, that the LGBT community in Jerusalem 
should keep their head down, shouldn’t be visible and that the pride 
march is seen as a provocation against religious people.”79
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Jerusalem Open House staff member, Ilay, expressed that visibility 
is a prominent issue facing Jerusalem’s LGBT community. Ilay advocates 
for Jerusalem being seen and known for all of its communities, not only 
its more religious residents. Speaking about the LGBT community in 
Jerusalem, Ilay said,
There is a strong [LGBT] community here. And I feel that we are not seen 
publicly. When people think about Jerusalem, they wouldn’t think about 
us. They would think about an Orthodox city, about a very religious city. 
I think Jerusalem has a lot of differences in the communities inside of it. 
And most of these differences don’t show up and there are a lot of struggles 
within it. Even just, people that want children to be a little more secular or 
maybe more secular friendly.80
The matter of secularization is, in fact, especially contentious in Jeru-
salem as a result of the city’s more conservative Jewish, Muslim, and 
Christian communities. Despite Ilay’s hopes that Jerusalem’s LGBT com-
munity gain visibility for its personal pride and identity, it has historically 
received attention as a result of its relations with the city’s more homo-
phobic residents or, worse, instances of violence and homophobia. The 
most visible and terrible manifestations of homophobia in Jerusalem have 
twice occurred during the city’s annual pride parade.
Jerusalem Pride has had a troubled history. Though the first Tel 
Aviv Pride Parade took place in 1997 and draws an annual crowd of 
over 250,000, Jerusalem’s own Pride began in 2002 and, at most, attracts 
a tenth of the marchers. Jerusalem’s ultra-Orthodox community protests 
this parade each year. These protests have taken the form of throwing 
eggs at marchers, putting up posters denouncing the parade, and refer-
ring to homosexuals as “subhuman.”81 In 2006, Israeli Knesset member 
Bezalel Smotrich of the Jewish Home Party helped organize an anti-gay 
parade, referred to as the “Beast Parade,” in Jerusalem in response to the 
city’s Pride Parade.82 Smotrich, still at present a Knesset lawmaker, made 
comments in 2015 in which he referred to the annual Pride Parade as 
an “abomination.”83 These actions offer a window into the homophobic 
beliefs that are held by a variety of Knesset members, especially within 
the more conservative parties. In 2007 and 2008, the Israeli Knesset 
approved legislation to ban gay pride parades from taking place in Jeru-
salem. Though these laws were never passed, they represent some of the 
national and government sentiment regarding homosexuality’s place in 
their capital.
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The Jerusalem pride parade remains a source of contention in 
Israel today. Despite heavy security between 10,000 and 15,000 march-
ers attended the 2019 Jerusalem pride.84 All participants were searched 
and tagged and the event was heavily barricaded by security and police. 
Twenty-two people were arrested at the march, one of whom was car-
rying a knife.85 Jerusalem chief rabbi Aryeh Stern condemns all violence 
but opposes the march, stating in 2017, “The essence of this parade is 
contradicting the trend of Jerusalem as a holy city, and that is the city 
we want.”86 To have the capital’s chief rabbi plainly suggest that a pride 
parade is a hindrance to the city’s desired religious identity contradicts 
with Israel’s pro-gay identity. In 2019 Stern reiterated his stance asking 
the Mayor to ban all pride flags at the Jerusalem march, complaining that 
“they make the city ugly.87
Jerusalem Pride was home to two eerily identical hate crimes in 
the years 2005 and 2015. In 2005, a Haredi Jewish man, Yishai Schlissel, 
stabbed three individuals marching in the parade. In regard to his crimes, 
Schlissel stated, “I came to murder in the name of God. Such abomi-
nation cannot exist in Israel.”88 Schlissel was sentenced to 12 years in 
prison. He was released three weeks before Jerusalem’s 2015 Pride parade 
to which he returned and stabbed six more participants, one of whom 
died from her wounds.89 Following this second senseless act of violence, 
Israeli media criticized the police for failing to enact measures to keep 
the recently released Schlissel away from the event.90 Though this level of 
violence is exceptional, analysis of the ultra-Orthodox community does 
reveal widespread homophobic sentiment.
Homosexuality in the ultra-
Orthodox (Haredi) Community
The Haredi, or “ultra-Orthodox,” Jewish community in Israel makes 
up 12% of the nation’s overall population.91 The conservative, religious 
demographic grew to over one million Israelis in 2017.92 In a 2013 
report, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics lists the factors that dis-
tinguish the Haredim93 from the rest of the Jewish population. Their 
description is included, ver batum, below.94
• Internally diverse religious (“ultra-orthodox”) subculture, resist-
ing modern culture and western lifestyles, guided by authoritative 
[r]abbis
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• Live in self-segregated geographic communities
• Separate, distinctive educational institutions
• Early arranged marriages, high fertility norms
• Economic[s] based on private welfare institutions, universal state 
benefits, and female employment
• Distinct political parties protect way of life through political 
bargaining
The ultra-Orthodox community’s high-birth rate has drawn signifi-
cant attention in regard to the future breakdown of Israel’s population. 
The average birth rate for Haredi women in 2017 was 6.9 children, 
as opposed to the 2.4 children in the non-Haredi Jewish population.95 
The Israeli Democracy Institute predicts that the Haredi community 
will equal 16% of the population by 2030 and will make up one third 
of Israel’s population and 40% of its Jewish population by 2065.96 The 
projected increase in size of this community suggests a likely growth in 
influence as well. In light of this probability, the ultra-Orthodox commu-
nity’s negative attitude towards homosexuality grows more significant to 
Israel’s national identity and pro-gay brand and to the longterm survival 
of LGBT rights.
The ultra-Orthodox community strictly follows Halacha, Jewish 
religious law. Halacha alone dictates the ultra-Orthodox conversation 
on homosexuality, and according to Halacha it is forbidden. The Torah 
condemns same sex sexual acts between males in Leviticus 18:22, which 
reads, “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomina-
tion,” and again in Leviticus 20:13, “If a man lies with a male as with a 
woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put 
to death; their blood is upon them.” Though the Torah does not explic-
itly forbid same sex sexual acts between females, those too are considered 
against Halacha.
Historically, and still throughout many Israeli ultra-Orthodox 
communities, homosexual desires are completely ignored and repressed. 
Until recently, the existence of homosexuality was not acknowledged 
by the ultra-Orthodox. This ignorance was aided by the fact that hara 
(gossip) is not allowed in the ultra-Orthodox faith nor is chilul Hashem 
(“desecrating God’s name).97 Between those two rules alone, homo-
sexual acts, when they do occur are not spoken about to anyone. The 
ultra-Orthodox rarely talk to their children about sex of any kind, thus 
creating a sexually uninformed environment in which even physical 
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activity between a husband and wife can be challenging. It is common in 
these communities for LGBT people to marry and have children regard-
less of their undisclosed identity. Among those ultra-Orthodox who do 
acknowledge such feelings, many rabbis would still advocate that the 
afflicted ignore their urges, marry, and reproduce.
In 2004 Rabbi Chaim Rapoport was widely considered the most 
progressive authority on ultra-Orthodox homosexuality. His 2004 book 
Judaism and Homosexuality: An Authentic Orthodox View was the first book 
written on the subject by a respected member of the Orthodox com-
munity. Though he received widespread criticism for daring to write on 
the subject, the book was praised as brave and forward thinking by many 
of the more progressive thinking ultra-Orthodox. Rabbi Rapoport’s 
“progressive” stance remained in line with religious law. He agrees that 
homosexuality goes against Halacha. At no point in the book does he 
explain how a same-sex couple could live according to Halacha. What 
made his book so groundbreaking was simply the fact that he acknowl-
edged the struggle with homosexuality as real.
Until recently, the most “progressive” approaches to homosexuality 
in the ultra-Orthodox community were corrective therapy and absti-
nence. In Israel today “corrective” or “conversion” therapy, in which a 
person receives psychological treatment aimed at reversing their homo-
sexual urges and teaching them to “become” straight, remains an all too 
real option. In 2016 the Knesset rejected a bill proposing that the use 
of conversion therapy on a minor be counted as a criminal offense.98 
In 2014 the largest Jewish conversion therapy operation JONAH was 
ordered to close in the United States by a New Jersey court. Following 
this case JONAH moved its headquarters to Israel and began operating 
under the name People Can Change.99 Additionally the ultra-Orthodox 
organization Atzat Nefresh was founded in 2001 to address inappropriate 
sexual urges and behavior in the community, including homosexuality, 
pornography, sexual abuse, prostitution and masturbation. Atzat Nefresh, 
which translates to “Psychological Advice” offers conversion therapy 
intended to “reverse inclinations” in Orthodox individuals struggling 
with homosexual feelings.100 Despite its presence in Israel conversion 
therapy still remains a somewhat progressive approach to homosexuality 
for many ultra-Orthodox. Common beliefs among the Israeli ultra-
Orthodox community are either that homosexuality does not exist or, if 
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it does, homosexuals should ignore their feelings and marry members of 
the opposite sex.
In recent years a conversation has begun in the Modern Ortho-
dox community and a few alternate approaches to the “homosexuality 
issue” have revealed themselves. Most notably, the formation of Yachad, a 
“liberal” Modern Orthodox congregation based in Tel Aviv, which is the 
first and only Orthodox congregation to allow openly gay members.101 
The extent of that “openness” remains in question, especially in terms of 
Halacha’s stance on homosexuality. Even this most progressive commu-
nity cannot condone acting against the law, but it has been suggested that 
a policy remnant of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” may have begun to form. In 
other words, since Halacha only forbids penetrative intercourse between 
two men, the congregation may choose to believe that its homosexual 
members abstain from such “illegal” acts while maintaining an otherwise 
intimate relationship. Budding tolerance for LGBT people in the Ortho-
dox community has primarily taken place in more progressive Modern 
Orthodox congregations as opposed to the ultra-Orthodox.
The rise of homosexual acceptance worldwide, and certainly Isra-
el’s pro-gay policies, has allowed some slight progress to take place within 
the ultra-Orthodox community. Following the 2015 stabbing attack at 
Jerusalem Pride, a group of individuals from the ultra-Orthodox com-
munity came to Jerusalem Open House and began a dialogue with a 
group of LGBT people and allies.102 This unprecedented occurrence 
represented for many of the participants, on both sides, the first real 
inter-community interaction. This conversation included a comment 
by a Haredi man regarding the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem distinction. The man, 
whose identity was not disclosed for his own protection, bluntly stated, 
“We’re very homophobic. The Haredi public community fears homo-
sexuals and all those related concepts . . . As long as it’s in Tel Aviv that’s 
one thing, but when they come to Jerusalem it’s terrible.”103
In September 2017 the resignation of ultra-Orthodox Shas party 
MK Yigal Guetta drew further attention to the status of homosexuality 
in the ultra-Orthodox community. Guetta was forced to resign after news 
broke that he and his family attended his nephew’s same-sex wedding 
ceremony. Speaking on his decision to attend Guetta said, “Beforehand, 
I told my kids: ‘We’re going to make him happy because he’s my sister’s 
son and I want him to be happy, but I want you to know that accord-
ing to the Torah this [wedding] is forbidden and an abomination. I have 
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no leeway on this.’”104 Though Guetta never swayed from his beliefs his 
attendance alone sparked widespread outrage in the community. Five 
prominent ultra-Orthodox rabbis penned a letter condemning Guetta 
and calling for him to be fired for having “publicly desecrated God’s 
will.”105 When reporting this story the leading Israeli news source Haaretz 
argued that the story was a sign of progress in the ultra-Orthodox com-
munity. The article, “Whisper It, but Israel’s ultra-Orthodox Community 
Is Starting to Talk About Homosexuality,106” claimed that the bigger 
story was the fact that an ultra-Orthodox MK attended a gay wed-
ding at all. The same article noted that the ultra-Orthodox MK Eliezer 
Moses had recently publicly acknowledged that one of his 10 children 
is lesbian and that he respects her and remains only concerned for her 
welfare. These and other exceptional instances in which homosexual-
ity has been acknowledged, if not accepted, by public ultra-Orthodox 
figures are promising. Perhaps the community is moving from a system 
in which homosexuality is not recognized into one where it is at times 
acknowledged and even passively or secretly tolerated. Unfortunately, 
the overwhelming approach to homosexuality in the ultra-Orthodox 
Israeli community is still primarily judgment, condemnation, expulsion 
and even hate.
Ultra-Orthodox attitudes on homosexuality are relevant to Israel’s 
claims regarding its stance as a gay-friendly nation, especially as ultra-
Orthodox influence in the government expands. Thus far the impact of 
religious rejection of homosexuality in Israel has manifested not only 
in the lack of gay marriage and the blocking of legislation but in the 
form of discrimination and violence. The passing down of homopho-
bic hate to another generation is also particularly concerning. There 
are about 300,000 students, 18% of the Israeli student population, in 
ultra- Orthodox schools in Israel.107 This matter gained public attention 
following the 2015 Jerusalem Pride stabbing, when an ultra-Orthodox 
school canceled their meeting with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin. 
They informed the president that he was not welcome after hearing of 
the public support he offered to the LGBT community following the 
attack in Jerusalem.108 The presence and encouragement of homophobia 
in ultra-Orthodox schools, despite the national policy of equality, has 
incited some government condemnation in the LGBT community.
Regarding the persistence of homophobia and the attack in Jerusa-
lem, JOH spokesman Tom Canning shared his frustration in a Jerusalem Post 
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article: “[Canning] and others in the gay community . . . viewed the attack 
as symptomatic of the government turning a blind eye toward extremist 
religious rhetoric. [Canning said,] ‘LGBT people in Israel are regularly vic-
tims of discrimination . . . It can be violence, it can be rejection of services, 
it can be slurs on the street.’”109 Though Tel Aviv is thriving and a necessary 
conversation on homosexuality has arisen in the most progressive circles of 
the ultra-Orthodox community, LGBT residents of Jerusalem and other, 
more homophobic, communities continue to struggle in Israel.
Conclusion
The actions analyzed in this paper, the provision of LGBT rights, the 
concentrated public-private effort to rebrand Tel Aviv, and the growth of 
the gay tourism industry, prove that homosexuality has been accepted, to 
an extent, into Israel’s national identity. The progressive rights afforded 
LGBT Israelis represent a liberal victory in a country that is largely 
defined by religion and geographic location in a region with little to 
no state-recognized LGBT tolerance. The advancement of gay rights in 
Israel allows countless individuals to live freely and proudly, particularly 
in the tolerant city of Tel Aviv, while simultaneously contributing to a 
shift in Israel’s international reputation from one of conflict and extrem-
ism to one of acceptance and modernity. In Tel Aviv, Israel has created a 
fiscally beneficial safe haven for Israeli and visiting LGBT people. Israel 
has also seen a substantial change in their international brand, now being 
widely perceived in the West as a “fun” and “liberal” destination.
However, the existence of religious and societal homophobia, 
sometimes seen through violent attacks, as well as the lack of gay mar-
riage and blocking of pro-LGBT laws, including the recent surrogacy 
law, suggest that homosexuality is far from fully accepted into Israel’s 
identity. Though slow progress is being made in some progressive circles 
of the ultra-Orthodox community, it is not enough. Tolerance is still the 
exception in this community and discrimination and homophobia per-
sist. Laws designed to further protect the LGBT community are failing 
in the Knesset, all while Israel benefits from its pro-gay external brand. 
Meanwhile the Haredi community is growing in numbers and politi-
cal capital. If Israel is to promote itself as a tolerant gay destination the 
government must continue to institute legal and equal protections for its 
citizens and condemn the encouragement of hate against LGBT people.
49
E x a m i n i n g  I s r a e l ’ s  P r o - G a y  B r a n d
This paper juxtaposed the rebranding of Tel Aviv as a gay city with 
the status of homosexuality in Jerusalem and the ultra-Orthodox com-
munity in order to investigate the pervasiveness of Israel’s pro-gay brand. 
However, there are many other segments of the Israeli population signifi-
cant to this discussion not addressed in this brief analysis. The legal rights 
granted to LGBT people in Israel have certainly impacted the lives of 
LGBT Israelis in areas apart from the aforementioned major cities of Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem. Further the ultra-Orthodox community is not the 
only community, religious or otherwise, in Israel preaching homophobic 
beliefs. It was selected for this particular analysis on account of its size and 
growing influence in the Israeli political system. Also relevant to Israel’s gay 
brand and not discussed in this paper is Israel’s relationship with LGBT 
Palestinians. Israel’s refusal to grant asylum to LGBT Palestinians both vio-
lates the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol110 and challenges 
its claim to be a “gay haven”111 in the Middle East. Interested parties can 
also read into the disparity in LGBT resources for Arab-Israeli schools and 
the experience of LGBT Arab-Israelis in the Tel Aviv gay scene.
In conclusion, Israel has made a consistent effort to provide rights 
to LGBT Israelis since long before establishing Tel Aviv as a gay capital. 
The government has also frequently publically condemned violence 
against the LGBT community and encouraged tolerance throughout 
Israel. However, while investing in this tolerant pro-gay identity, it has 
also supported Israel’s religious national identity allowing marriage to 
remain in the hands of the rabbinical courts and proponents of reli-
gious law to gain increasing political influence. This precarious balance 
between secular and religious identity impacts all levels of Israeli society 
and politics and is contributing to the current failure to institute more 
extensive legal rights for its LGBT citizens. Ultimately, if Israel is to 
continue promoting its pro-gay external brand then its government must 
invest equally in protecting and supporting its own LGBT community.
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